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THE CONCEPT OF YI (义) IN THEMENCIUS
AND PROBLEMS OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE1
Sor-hoon Tan
This paper examines attempts to find a conception of justice in early Confucian
contexts, focusing on the concept of yi (translated as ‘appropriateness’, ‘right’,
‘rightness’, even ‘justice’) in the Mencius. It argues against the approach of
deriving principles of dividing burdens and benefits from the discussions of
concrete cases employing the concept of yi and instead shows that Confucian
ethical concerns are more attentive to what kinds of interpersonal relations are
appropriate in specific circumstances. It questions the exclusive emphasis in
justice-centred ethical discourse on assessing actions, and even more narrowly
actions of governments and other public institutions, and their consequences
regarding distribution of rights and material resources and goods. Instead of
applying some abstract principles of justice, whether of equality or some other
priorities according to individual characteristics, distributive problems are
approached from the perspective of the effect of any proposed distribution on
interpersonal relationships. Principles of justice treat opportunities, resources,
and goods that are supposed to be distributed as possessions or potential
possessions of individuals always competing for resources and goods.
Confucians treat them not as objects to be possessed by one and denied to
others, but as facilitators of personal cultivation effecting appropriate
interpersonal relationships constituting harmonious communities. The
Mencius offers a different perspective on distributive problems by shifting our
ethical attention from ‘who gets what?’ to ‘how should we relate to others?’
within a different conception of the good life and the ideal society or polity.
Keywords: Confucianism; Confucian ethics; relational ethics; virtue; appropri-
ateness (yi).
The Mencius frequently uses ‘yi’ (义) with ‘ren’ (仁) to refer generally to the
ethical. The ‘beginning of yi’ is among the ‘four sprouts’ that constitute the
good dispositions (xing 性) human beings are born with [2A6; also 6A6
and 7A21].2 The term ‘yi’ has been translated as ‘meaning’, ‘significance’,
‘righteousness’, ‘rightness’, ‘right’, ‘principle’, ‘integrity’, and sometimes
‘just’ or ‘justice.’ Translating Mencius’ [7B2] claim that there was no ‘yizhan
义战’ in the Spring and Autumn period into a claim about ‘just war’ has gen-
erated a recent discussion of how the Mencius may cast new light on the
topic of just war which, dating back to medieval times in Europe, has
received renewed interest in the wake of the United States’ military action in
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Society of Asian and Comparative Philosophy 2012
Annual Meeting, at the Center for East Asian and Comparative Philosophy, City University of Hong Kong,
and the Columbia University Neo-Confucian Seminar. I thank those who gave feedback on the paper on
those occasions, as well as the anonymous referees, whose comments helped improve this paper significantly.
I bear sole responsibility for its remaining inadequacies, omissions, and errors.
2 Cf. Lau’s [1984] translation of ‘duan端’ as ‘germ’.
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Iraq and Afghanistan [Bell 2003]. The question of whether ‘yi’ in early Con-
fucian texts means ‘justice’ is worthy of attention given the increasing con-
cerns about social justice in China and elsewhere, both in academic circles
and the larger society, coupled with the revival of interest in the Confucian
tradition in China. Could we find in the Mencius’ discussions of ‘yi’ resour-
ces for a better understanding, new perspectives, and possible solutions of
the problems of distributive justice today?
Inquiries into whether the pre-Qin Confucians had anything to teach us
about justice need not focus on the notion of yi. For example, Joseph Chan
approaches the topic of whether there is a Confucian perspective on social
justice by arguing that pre-Qin Chinese societies share with other societies
characteristics that, according to contemporary theorists, give rise to cir-
cumstances of social justice; he then goes on to examine how Mencius and
Xunzi responded to typical social justice ‘issues such as poverty, differentia-
tion of social roles and functions, inequality of income and status, and the
distributive role of government’ [Chan 2009: 269]. Erin Cline’s [2013] com-
parison of the sense of justice in John Rawls’s theory of justice and the Ana-
lects shows that a sense of justice develops through the cultivation of an
entire set of virtues, regardless of whether there is an equivalent term for
‘justice’ in early Confucianism; her nuanced exploration would lose much of
its richness if limited to the analysis of any single term in the text. Bearing in
mind that the project of reconstructing a Confucian theory of justice would
be broader in scope, this paper is concerned only with the narrower question
of whether the concept of yi and related discussions in theMencius have con-
tributions to make to solving problems of distributive justice today.
Yang Xiao [1997: 534] argues there is a concept of justice in Confucianism
since ‘yi’ sometimes behaves like the word ‘just,’ meaning ‘to treat cases that
belong to the same kind alike and cases that belong to different kinds differ-
ently’. Xiao’s analysis focuses on discussions of taking, having, or accepting
things in the Mencius. Such actions have distributive dimensions insofar as
such actions affect different people’s shares of resources and goods. From
those discussions, one could try to identify and defend a set of principles of
justice that guide the distribution of burdens and benefits in society in accor-
dance with Mencius’ ethical vision. However, such an exercise turns out to
be highly problematic. I shall show that yi is better understood as relational
appropriateness, and while it has no direct contribution to distributive
issues, the relationship-centred perspective nevertheless illuminates Mencius’
solutions to distributive problems. Instead of following other contemporary
theories of justice by identifying principles of just distribution, uncovering
the emphasis on relationship in Mencian ethics offers a different perspective
on ethical priorities when it comes to social life and human relationships.
1. Individual-orientation of Distributive Justice
Chan [2009: 262, 263] notes that the concept of social justice is primarily a
distributive and individual-oriented idea, concerning ‘how benefits and bur-
dens should be passed out among individuals according to some principle of
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rightness’ and ‘on the basis of the personal characteristics and circumstances
of an individual involved’. The orientation of distributive justice emphasizes
the separateness of individuals even within inevitable or desirable human
associations—it is the separateness that must be reckoned with in any act of
distribution. While distributive problems undoubtedly highlight separate-
ness of individuals, solutions could adopt different normative attitudes
towards this separateness, and towards the related conceptions of individual
and social relation. For David Hall and Roger Ames, yi involves acts
importing significance into the world through optimizing appropriateness in
relations with others. Such acts of yi contribute to the cultivation of an
‘exalted self’ that is not an atomistic individual constantly in competition or
at war with others but a ‘person-in-context’ for whom social relations are
constitutive of their sense of self [Hall and Ames 1987: 94]. A similar orienta-
tion is present in Huaiyu Wang’s [2009: 327] claim that, for Mencius, ‘the
root of justice lies in the sensus communis of the human heart.’ If yi has any-
thing to do with distributive justice, it implies ways of approaching human
separateness and relations different from individualistic theories.
In the Mencius, the pull towards separateness is registered by considera-
tions of li利 (profit, personal/private benefit), which is sometimes contrasted
with yi, as the unethical is contrasted with the ethical.3 This contrast recalls
and elaborates Analects 4.16 [Ames and Rosemont 1998]:
The Master said, ‘Exemplary persons (junzi 君子) understand what is appro-
priate (yi义); petty persons understand what is of personal advantage (li利).
The Mencius seems to infer from observations of people’s conduct and its
consequences, and therefore claims only contingent rather than necessary
opposition between yi and li. There are occasions when ‘li’ refers to ethically
neutral benefit, gain, or advantage, such as geographical advantage (dili 地
利 in 4B26), which could be sought for ethical or unethical purpose. InMen-
cius 1A5, the term is used to mean ‘sharpness’, ‘sharp’, or ‘to sharpen’—
literally in reference to weapons or tools. Just as sharp tools are instruments
increasing one’s effectiveness in relevant activities, li can refer to any contri-
bution to effectiveness or doing well [2B1; 4B26], in actions both unethical
(likou利口 ‘glibness’ in 7B37) and ethical (benefitting the people in 7A13, or
benefiting the world in 7A26). The ethical uses of li in the Mencius refer to
benefits conferred on all or can be shared by all, rather than in situations
where distribution to individuals and groups is required to resolve conflict
or competition.
In Mencius’ view [2B10], while li is not necessarily unethical, its motivat-
ing force focuses on individual gain in situations of conflict or competition,
and such gain is more often than not at the expense of others:
In antiquity, the market was for the exchange of what one had for what one
lacked. The authorities merely supervised it. There was, however, a despicable
fellow who always looked for a vantage point and, going up on it, gazed into
3 Some examples of such opposition are found inMencius 1A1, 6B4, 7A25. See also [Hall and Ames 1987: 93].
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the distance to the left and to the right in order to secure for himself all the
profit there was in the market (wang shili罔市利). The people all thought him
despicable, and, as a result, they taxed him. The taxing of traders began with
this despicable fellow.
Redistribution by the state, through means such as taxation, is necessitated
because people act out of selfish motivations when they focus on individual-
istic material gains. If solutions to unacceptable distribution encourage the
same individualistic selfish motivation that leads to the problem in the first
place, the erosion of the ethical cannot be reversed and in all likelihood will
gain momentum. While all societies with limited resources and goods face
distributive issues, they approach such issues differently. The Mencius
approaches the obvious and inevitable physical separateness of human
beings as individuals and the consequent competition and conflict in distrib-
utive situations as facts that, though inevitable, should be given less empha-
sis than overcoming them with the ethical relations that bind individuals in
community.
2. Agent, Action, and Interpersonal Relationships
According to D.C. Lau [1979: 27], while ren in the Analects is more about
the character of agents than of acts, yi is ‘basically a characteristic of acts,
and its application to agents is derivative’. The Mencius frequently refers to
yi with metaphors of ‘road’ or ‘walking’, which emphasizes action. However,
to privilege action at the expense of agent goes against Mencius’ view that yi
is rooted in the heart-mind [7A21]. When Mencius asked Gaozi, ‘is it the
one who is old that is yi, or is it the one who treats him as elder that is yi?’
[6A4], yi describes the agent. When Mencius rejected Gaozi’s claim that ‘yi
is external, not internal’ the inference is not that yi is the opposite, i.e. purely
internal. Rather, yi is both external and internal, about agent as well as
action. Why is this important? The question of whether agent or conduct is
primary in usages of yi is important because contemporary theories of justice
(in contrast to classical views of justice as virtue) emphasize the external,
focusing on principles of actions for institutions and policies. For example,
Rawls [1971: 3] maintains that justice is the ‘first virtue of social institutions’.
Reading yi as primarily about actions facilitates comparison with contem-
porary theories of justice with a tendency to focus on principles for action.
Various objections have been made to reading yi as having to do with princi-
ples, especially if these imply some kind of universal rational order. In earlier
Chinese texts, yi and ‘yi宜,’ a homonym meaning ‘right, proper, appropri-
ate, suitable’ are often used interchangeably. The Zhongyong中庸 (a chapter
in the Record of Rites and one of the Four Books in the Confucian curricu-
lum) equates yi with yi [Ames and Hall 2001: 101]. Situations invoking yi
generally avoid rigid adherence to any absolute rule or unchanging norm
and promote acting with flexibility in response to particular situations. In
theMencius, the concept of yi pays special attention to the concrete particu-
lars in any situation when guiding action. Mencius’ responses to criticisms
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of inconsistency indicate that his actions were guided by flexible attention to
particular circumstances of concrete situations, including particularities of
the agent, and his views fit together better if the particular contexts of the
different occasions in which the views were espoused were taken into
account. Mencius praised Confucius’ flexible attitude to taking office [5B4]
and the ‘timeliness’ that distinguished Confucius as a sage [5B1].
Paying attention to particulars does not require one to dispense with prin-
ciples altogether. Xiao [1997: 538] elicits from the Mencius a particularist
principle according to which some cases of gift-taking are alike, but different
from other cases of gift-taking, so that both refusal and acceptance are right
in treating similar cases alike and different cases differently. If pushed to the
extreme so that no two situations ever are considered alike in any way, then
emphasis on particularities and uniqueness of situations precludes ethical
guidance, which is an important aim of the text. Xiao’s analysis of how
Mencius justifies his actions shows that there are generic reasons and rules
applicable to more than one case that help one decide what to do in any
given situation. While these are not foundational principles such as the util-
ity principle or Kant’s categorical imperative, they are referred to as princi-
ples and employed in public policy making—rules established through a
combination of reasoning and empirical information, open to justified
exceptions and modifications according to specific circumstances.
Whether universalistic or particularistic, principles of actions should not
neglect characteristics of agents. Cline [2013: 97–111] argues that, even in
Rawls’s theory, the sense of justice requires moral cultivation; insofar as
principles of justice will result in a stable just society only if citizens share a
sense of justice, characters of agents clearly matter as much as principles of
action. In contemporary societies, the true agents of justice are citizens with
the power to establish, shape, or remove institutions and the principles they
operate with. Furthermore, as no principle can specify every detail that
might become relevant, the need to exercise judgment and the skills (or lack
thereof) with which implementation is carried out means that characteristics
of agents cannot be completely ignored in the pursuit of justice. Agents and
actions do not exhaust all significant input in theories of justice. Just actions
are other-oriented, pertaining to how an agent treats others. Principles of
distributive justice necessarily refer to and compare characteristics of those
among whom something is distributed. The recipients of what is distributed
are not passive, but respond in various ways that render themselves agents
in a continuing process of interaction with those carrying out the distribu-
tion, as well as with others receiving or not receiving what is distributed.
Rather than seeking principles applicable to actions that distribute bene-
fits and burdens according to the personal characteristics and circumstances
of individuals, I wish to propose an approach to understanding yi as rela-
tional appropriateness that may be formulated in terms of norms of actions,
including distributive actions.4 The norms of appropriate relationships that
4 These generic norms are no different from the non-foundational, non-universalistic, and non-absolute prin-
ciples employed in public policy and practical decision-making mentioned earlier. I choose to use the term
‘norms’ to side-step the tendency of many readers steeped in the Chinese Philosophy vocabulary debates to
treat principles as essentially foundational.
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yi encompasses are not explicitly or systematically formulated in the text,
probably to avoid the tendency of rules or principles once formulated to
reify and be ‘pushed to the extreme’ [3B10]. While it may be a useful philo-
sophical exercise to derive the generic norms implicit in the textual examples
intended to guide action, one must keep in mind the insistence on flexibility
that is essential to the idea of yi itself. Human relationships are not static,
but grow or diminish, are created or destroyed, sustained or undermined,
through a process of interaction comprising actions relating people in appro-
priate or inappropriate ways. The norms of yi are norms of action, but differ
from principles of action formulated in terms of distribution according to
personal characteristics and circumstances of those receiving what is distrib-
uted; actions conform to yi norms in terms of their effect on the existing or
potential relationships among the people involved. As relationships are
dynamic and extend over time, norms of yi do not assess actions in episodic
isolation but within processes of interaction. Even in distributive situations
in which conditions of scarcity cause competition and conflicts, and raise the
question of who should have what and how much, the actions of yi are not
so much acts dividing benefits or burdens as they are parts of interactions
relating persons to one another. Even though dividing implies some kind of
relation among those involved, and relating to one another may involve divi-
sion of burdens and benefits in distributive situations, the ethical outcomes
vary significantly, depending on the aspects on which one places the empha-
sis, and the angles from which one views the problem and determines the
solution. I believe that this relationship-centred approach offers importantly
different and better solutions to justice problems in relation to a larger Men-
cian ethical framework.
3. Mencian Relational Ethics
The proposed approach fits a Mencian ethics that is fundamentally rela-
tional. To Mencius, who often uses ‘renyi’ to signify everything that is ethi-
cal, the realization of ren and yi lies in how we relate to others, beginning
with the most basic family relationships. ‘The content of benevolence (ren) is
the serving of one’s parent; the content of dutifulness (yi) is obedience to
one’s elder brothers . . .’ [4A27]. Human relations are central to yi. Rather
than being solely about the agent or about the action in any situation, yi
characterizes an action in such a way that it relates the agent to the person(s)
towards whom the action is directed in a particular way. What motivates the
action is an emotion, a construal of someone as meriting being treated with
a certain kind of yi, and the action itself must have certain specific features
to meet that particular requirement of yi. Both the construal and the require-
ment are based on a particular relationship between the agent and the per-
son towards whom the yi act is directed, and the yi act further strengthens
or enhances that relationship ethically. The relational effect of each act is
understood in the context of other related acts, and is enhanced or tempered
by them in the continued process of interaction between two related parties.
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‘Yi between ruler and minister’, commonly accepted by all under heaven,
is one of the five basic human relational norms (wulun 五伦) that form the
core of ethical education in the Mencius [3A4; also 7B24]. The appropriate
relationships yi encompasses are not limited to political relationships. The
Mencius refers to yi of filial and brotherly relationships [1A3, 1A7]. Showing
respect toward an elder is yi, the appropriate way to relate to such a person,
and yi should be extended to ‘all under heaven’ [7A15]. Used together with
ren, yi is relevant to the relationships between ruler and minister, between
father and son, between elder and younger brothers, and more. A person
who ‘is obedient to his parents at home, and respectful to his elders abroad,
and acts as custodian of the way of the Former Kings for the benefit of
future students’ is ‘a man who practices renyi’ [3B4]. Living ethically is a
matter of cultivating and sustaining appropriate relations with other persons
one encounters in various circumstances.
Even when the Mencius explicitly discusses actions, the importance of
interpersonal relationships is undeniable. Take for example, Mencius’ objec-
tion to Song Keng’s use of the unprofitability of war to persuade the king of
Qin to end the hostilities between Qin and Chu. Mencius’ point is not that
there is something absolutely wrong in acting with profit in mind, but rather
that the proposed kinds of relationship based on profit are the opposite of
appropriate relations between ‘prince and subject, father and son, elder
brother and younger brother’, and relationships based on li imperilled the
state while the prince of a state with appropriate relationships ‘is sure to
become a true king’ [6B4]. Relations based on li focus on division of material
goods, wealth, or power, and cast people in the role of competitors and ene-
mies in zero-sum win-lose situations. Mencius [1A1] pointed out in his con-
versation with King Hui of Liang, ‘if li is put before yi, there is no
satisfaction short of total usurpation.’
4. Yi as Norms of Relational Appropriateness
The focus on profit is harmful not only when it leads to conflicts; even peace-
ful sharing of wealth or peaceful transfer of goods requires careful attention
to the impact on interpersonal relations. This applies to a range of relation-
ships from family to political relations. Mencius 3B10 describes Chen
Zhongzi, famous for his scruples in matters of material goods and wealth,
refusing to live in his brother’s house or benefit from his brother’s income
on the grounds that they were not yi. Mencius dismissed as impractical the
extreme stance of refusing to be associated with anything or anyone that can
be considered not yi, but more importantly he disapproved of the effect of
Chen’s misguided scruples on his family relationships: ‘He ate what his wife
provided but not what his mother provided. He lived in Wu Ling but not in
his brother’s house.’ Chen should have valued the appropriate relationships
with his brother and his mother more highly than pushing some abstract
principle to its extreme. Mencius’ emphasis on interpersonal relationships
becomes clearer in the light of his comments on Chen on another occasion
[7A34]:
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Mencius said, ‘Everyone believes that Chen Zhongzi would refuse the state of
Qi were it offered to him against yi. But what he calls yi is merely the yi which
refuses a basketful of rice and a bowlful of soup. No one surpasses him in the
neglect of parents and the denial of relationships between prince and subject
and between superior and inferior.’
Although having, taking, and accepting things can have distributive implica-
tions, there is no concern in this conversation about distributive principles,
be it fairness, equality, desert, or merit. Mencius’ dismissal of Chen’s reputa-
tion for yi shows that his understanding of yi (which clearly differs from
some of his contemporaries) is in terms of relational appropriateness rather
than avoidance of anything tainted by the unethical, or just distribution of
burdens and benefits.
The preoccupation with interpersonal relationships is also evident in other
cases of having, taking, or accepting things. Actions such as ‘refusing a bas-
ketful of rice or a bowlful of soup’ may be ethically insignificant in one case
when based on misguided scruples, but may be weightier than life and death
in other instances when a situation involves entering some inappropriate
relationships, however temporary, that an exemplary person should never
be part of [6A10]:
Here is a basketful of rice and a bowlful of soup. Getting them will mean life;
not getting them will mean death. When these are given with abuse, even a
wayfarer would not accept them; when these are given after being trampled
upon, even a beggar would not accept them.
Accepting food thus given is to allow others to treat oneself as little better,
perhaps even worse than animals, and no self-respecting person, certainly
no exemplary person, should enter into such a relationship which is totally
inappropriate between persons. Indeed, to have no scruple about how one
takes or accepts things from others leads one into relationships that shame
not just the person who ignores the norms of appropriate relations, but
those related to them, as we see in the story of the man from Qi, whose wife
and concubine were shamed by his way of obtaining food and drink—
begging for leftovers from sacrifices to the dead—that rendered him an out-
cast. Instead of feasting in the company of ‘men of wealth and consequence’
as he bragged to his wife, in reality ‘not a single person in the city stopped to
talk to him’ [4B33]. Regardless of the value of the material things involved,
an exemplary person always considers whether having, taking, or accepting
them would be in accordance with the rites and thereby promote appropri-
ate relations between himself and others.
When Chen Zhen challenged Mencius’ apparently inconsistent response
to monetary gifts, Mencius explained [2B3],
When I was in Song, I was about to go on a long journey, and for a traveler
there is always a parting gift. The accompanying note said, ‘Presented as a
parting gift.’ Why then should I have refused? In Xue, I had to take precau-
tions for my safety. The message accompanying the gift said, ‘I hear that you
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are taking precautions for your safety. This is a contribution towards the
expenses of acquiring arms.’ Again, why should I have refused? But in the case
of Qi I had no justification for accepting a gift. To accept a gift without justifi-
cation is tantamount to being bought. Surely a gentleman (junzi 君子) should
never allow himself to be bought.
In the first two cases, the gift, very likely part of an ongoing interaction,
invokes between the giver and the recipient an appropriate relationship
acceptable to the exemplary person. In the last case, accepting the gift would
amount to entering or perpetuating an inappropriate relationship. The same
kind of consideration applies to Mencius’ permitting acceptance of charity
(zhou周) that a prince ‘gives to those who have come from abroad to settle’,
but not what is bestowed (ci 赐) ‘when one has no regular duties’ [5B6].
Wages for employment with clear responsibilities and charity in specific cir-
cumstances provide justifications for accepting things from the politically
powerful and wealthy; the absence of justifications places a recipient in the
position of ‘being bought’ for questionable purposes. The difference between
permissible and impermissible actions has to do with what kind of relation-
ship exists or will be created between the giver and the recipient.
The larger context of Mencius’ relationship to the King of Qi is worthy of
closer scrutiny to illustrate the operation of yi norms in relational interactive
processes. Mencius had accepted a position without remuneration in Qi,
against what he acknowledged to be ancient practice [2B14]. The King’s sub-
sequent offer of gold as gift, rather than showing appreciation for Mencius,
was doubly inappropriate in making Mencius beholden to him if the gift
were accepted, after having denied Mencius the rightful remuneration of his
appointment. That Mencius did not simply accept the offer of gold as wages
instead of a gift also makes an important point that, despite appointing him
to office, the King by ignoring his advice did not truly employ him as a good
ruler should.5 The King’s typical response to Mencius’ advice was to ‘turn
to his attendants and change the subject’ [1B6], or to do exactly the opposite
of what Mencius advised, as when the King annexed Yan without the sup-
port of its population [1B10-11]. When the people of Yan rebelled against
the Qi invaders, the King ‘was ashamed to face Mencius’, but instead of
admitting his fault, he permitted Chen Jia to go and try to persuade Mencius
not to think too badly of him with some specious comparison with the Duke
of Zhou and a lame remark that ‘even a sage makes mistakes’. Mencius
[2B9] responded with some exasperation, ‘when he made a mistake, the gen-
tleman of antiquity would make amends . . . . The gentleman of today not
only persists in his mistakes but tries to gloss over them.’ The appropriate
norm of rulers employing worthy persons, seeking and accepting their advice
for good government, and showing respect for their virtue, is clearly absent
in the relationship between Mencius and the King of Qi.
5 Mencius himself did not make this point explicitly, although it is implicit in his interactions with the King.
Mencius’ own explanation, that his accepting a position without pay to begin with was because he had no
intention to stay long in Qi [2B14], made after he departed from Qi very reluctantly, ‘hoping against hope’
that the King would ‘change his mind’ and employ him [2B12], seems to be more of a face-saving excuse than
a good explanation.
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Mencius felt with some justification that the King of Qi treated him with a
lack of sincerity and respect. When Mencius resigned to return home, the
King went to see him [2B10]:
‘Previously,’ said the King, ‘I wished in vain to meet you. Then I had the
opportunity of attending you in the same court, much to my delight. Now you
abandon me and go home. I wonder if I shall have further opportunities of see-
ing you again.’ ‘That is just what I should wish,’ answered Mencius, ‘though I
dare not make the suggestion.’
Were the king sincere in valuing Mencius, he would reinstate Mencius offi-
cially and govern according to Mencius’ advice.6 Instead he took no such
action, but on another day sent someone to sound out Mencius as to
whether the latter would accept ‘a house in the most central part of the Qi
capital and a pension of ten thousand measures of rice to support his disci-
ples, so that the officials and the men of the capital will have an example to
look up to’ [2B10]. Such an offer treats Mencius as someone who can be
bought, in this case for the King’s purpose of appearing to ‘honour’ worthy
persons by materially supporting them, even though he did not truly honour
Mencius since he failed to take Mencius’ advice about good government
seriously.
The prevailing relationship between the King of Qi and Mencius could not
justify his offers of gold or the house and ten thousand measures of rice, for
the King had failed to meet the norms of yi between ruler and minister. His
sly manoeuvres to get Mencius to go see him at court, instead of paying
Mencius a visit as respect for worthy persons dictates, while seemingly triv-
ial, is symptomatic of the lack of yi in their interaction [2B2]:
Mencius was about to go to court to see the King, when a messenger came
from the King with the message, ‘I was to have come to see you, but am suffer-
ing from a chill and cannot be exposed to the wind. In the morning, however, I
shall be holding court. I wonder if I shall have the opportunity of seeing you
then.’ To this, Mencius replied, ‘Unfortunately, I too am ill and shall be unable
to come to court.’
Although Mencius’ reaction may seem petty and disrespectful (some
bystanders said as much in the text), there is an important issue of mutual
respect at stake here, elaborated in other discussions about whether one
should seek ‘audience with the feudal lords’ or answer their summons [5B7].
‘When a Commoner,’ said Wan Zhang, ‘is summoned to corvee he goes to serve.
Why then should he refuse to go when he is summoned to an audience?’ ‘It is
right [yi] for him to go and serve, but it is not right for him to present himself.
Moreover, for what reason does the prince wish to see him?’ ‘For the reason that
he is well-informed or that he is good and wise.’ ‘If it is for the reason that he is
6 That this is what Mencius expected is made clear in 2B12, when Mencius explained that he took his time
departing from Qi because he ‘hoped against hope that the king would change his mind’. He continued, ‘If
the king had employed me, it would not simply be a matter of bringing peace to the people of Qi, but of bring-
ing peace to the people of the whole empire as well.’
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well-informed, even the Emperor does not summon his teacher, let alone a feudal
lord. If it is for the reason that he is a good and wise man, then I have never
heard of summoning such a man when one wishes to see him.’
To summon someone is to treat him as a subordinate; this is not the appro-
priate relation between a ruler, or any other politically more powerful or
socially superior person, and a wise and virtuous person, as it would elevate
political power or social eminence over ethical excellence.
In another conversation with Gongsun Chou, Mencius explained the yi of
his ‘not trying to see the feudal lords’ [3B7]. The action of trying to see the
feudal lords implies an official relationship of superior and subordinate
between the person who seeks such an audience and the feudal lord in ques-
tion. Mencius went on to describe Confucius’ interaction with Yang Huo
who wished to persuade Confucius to take office. Yang manoeuvred to have
Confucius go to his home instead of showing courtesy and deference by call-
ing personally on Confucius first. This conversation provides illuminating
background for Mencius 2B2: when Mencius was going to court to see the
King of Qi, he acknowledged his subordinate position as an appointed offi-
cial at the King’s court, but the King’s unnecessary message implies an
awareness that Mencius’ reputation as a ‘worthy’ person demands that he
paid Mencius a visit to show his respect; his transparent excuse then
becomes a disrespectful denial of Mencius’ worthiness. Mencius’ reaction,
instead of being merely a tit-for-tat motivated by wounded pride, takes a
stand on the need for mutual respect in the relationship between political
superiors and an exemplary person.
It is inappropriate for an exemplary person to subordinate or ingratiate
himself or act the supplicant, just as it is inappropriate for one who wishes
to meet an exemplary person to assert their superior social/political position
with arrogance or condescension, in breach of the rites showing respect. It is
especially important for the socio-politically superior to act according to the
rites in associating with a good and wise person, showing proper respect and
deference to the latter’s ethical excellence, because socio-political power
tempts those who possess it to subordinate others, and if the good and wise
are subordinated through a show of disrespect by the powerful, power sub-
ordinates virtue. This is made clear in Mencius’s own justification for his
reaction to the King of Qi in 2B2 [cf. 5B7]:
There are three things which are acknowledged by the world to be exalted:
rank, age, and virtue. At court, rank is supreme; in the village, age; but for
giving help to the world and ruling over the people, it is virtue. How can a
man, on the strength of possession of one of these, treat the other two with
arrogance? Hence, a prince if he is to achieve great things must have subjects
he does not summon.
Mencius’ comparison of the interaction between Duke Mu and Zisi, and
that between Yao and Shun, further advances our understanding of the
norms of appropriate relationship between someone in a superior socio-
political position and an exemplary person [5B6]:
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If in spite of one’s claim to like good and wise men, one is able neither to raise
them to office nor to take care of them, can one be truly said to like such
men?’ . . . In Zisi’s view, to make him bob up and down rendering thanks for
the gifts of meat for the tripod was hardly the right way to take care of an
exemplary person. In the case of Yao, he sent his nine sons to serve Shun and
gave him his two daughters as wives. After this, the hundred officials provided
Shun with cattle and sheep and granaries for his use while he worked in the
fields. And then Yao raised Shun to high office.
To show respect to those with ethical excellence, a person of greater political
power and high social status should avoid making the former beholden to
oneself with excessive generosity that demands rites emphasizing to the
recipient one’s superiority in material goods and power. Instead of sending
material gifts that require rites of gratitude from the recipient, what Yao did
for Shun explicitly acknowledges the latter’s ethical superiority and having
his children serve Shun elevated the latter in the actual interactive processes
of their relationship. Furthermore, the best way to show respect to the ethi-
cally excellent is to enable them to put their excellence to use by raising them
to office, which would render charity and generosity unnecessary since they
should receive what is required by their office and justified by their service.
The King of Qi clearly failed to befriend Mencius ‘in the correct way and
treat him with due ceremony’, which is the criterion for accepting gifts from
one’s superior in Mencius’ conversation with Wan Zhang about ‘social inter-
course’ [5B4]:
‘When a superior honors one with a gift, to accept it only after one has asked
the question, “Did he or did he not come by it through yi ?” shows a lack of
respect. This is why one does not refuse.’
‘Cannot one refuse, not in so many words, but in one’s heart? Thus while say-
ing to oneself, “He has taken this from the people by immoral means,” one
offers some other excuse for one’s refusal.’
‘When the superior makes friends with one in the correct way and treats one
with due ceremony, under such circumstances even Confucius would have
accepted a gift.’
Mencius’ dismissal of the concern about whether something offered is
obtained through ethical action is consistent with his rejection of Chen
Zhongzi’s scruples regarding the ethical status of his brother’s wealth in
3B10 and again points to an emphasis on acting to sustain an existing appro-
priate relationship.
However, Mencius’ position in this conversation runs into problems when
Wan Zhang pressed his concerns further [5B4]:
‘Now the way feudal lords take from the people is no different from robbery. If
a gentleman accepts gifts from them so long as the rites proper to social inter-
course are duly observed, what is the justification?’
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‘Do you think that if a true King should arise would he line up all the feudal
lords and punish them? Or do you think he would try reforming them first
before resorting to punishment?’
If Mencius’ point is that abandoning the appropriate relations with someone
because he has wronged (that is, ignored the appropriate relationship with)
someone else will not rectify the wrong, but instead will add to it by
increasing inappropriate relationships in the world, then the same must be
applied to the case of the robber, unless we have grounds to suppose that
appropriate relationships with the latter, unlike with the feudal lords, are
impossible.
Without denying Wan Zhang’s comparison of the feudal lords with a rob-
ber, whom Mencius admitted one can ‘punish without first attempting to
reform him’, Mencius’ dismissal of the concern about the justification for
accepting the feudal lords’ gifts made possible by ill-gotten gains is inconsis-
tent. If an exemplary person considers the appropriate relationship between
himself and the people, then should he not reject gifts from those whose
wealth derives from treating the people unjustly? One might defend Mencius
on the grounds that the relationship with the people is somewhat abstract,
due to the lack of actual social intercourse with specific individuals ‘wronged’
by the feudal lords, compared to those with whom one already has a relation-
ship established by appropriate social intercourse. However, this defence
would not avoid the comparison with the robber who ‘makes friends with
one in the correct way and treats one with due ceremony’. Furthermore, it
exposes serious limitations in too narrow a focus on actual particular relation-
ships at the expense of broader ethical concerns. Mencius’ condemnation of
robbers as beyond reform is probably too hasty, and he would have done bet-
ter recanting that careless remark, an unlikely move given Mencius’ combat-
ive argumentativeness. A better defence not offered by Mencius would be to
‘transfer’ at least some or all of the gifts from such a source to those toward
whom the giver has acted without yi in obtaining the wealth that made possi-
ble the gifts. This would give consideration to the appropriate relationship
between the exemplary person and the people, without undermining the
appropriate relationship with the superior who has treated one appropriately
even if he has acted inappropriately toward others.
5. Mencius’ Solutions to Distributive Problems
Feudal lords who took from the people in ways no different from robbery
were a major cause of disparities between rich and poor that cried out for
distributive justice. Given Mencius’ own ideal of benevolent government
and his demand that rulers behave like ‘parents of the people’, his view
about what is appropriate in interacting with feudal lords who can be said
to rob the people is surprising, to say the least. It inclines one to conclude
that, in theMencius, the concept of yi as norms of relational appropriateness
has little to do with distributive justice, even if it could fit into a broader
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understanding of justice as the right way to treat others. This does not mean
that the text has no interest in the problems of distributive justice. On the
contrary, it has much to say about problems arising from conditions of scar-
city (the fact that some resources and goods, if possessed by one, are thereby
denied to others), it is critical of prevailing distribution that causes suffering
among the people, and it maintains that a good government is responsible
for rectifying unacceptable distribution of goods and resources. Chan [2009:
275–6] deploys such textual material to reconstruct a Confucian perspective
on social justice comprising a mix of principles: sufficiency for all; priority
to the worst-off; merit and contribution. Other reconstructions, a needs-
based conception of justice, for example, are no doubt possible. My concern
in this section is not with such reconstructions, but with elucidating how
Mencius’ solutions to distributive problems fit his concept of yi as relational
appropriateness, and how this might contribute a new perspective on current
debates about distributive justice.
Mencius’ formula for good government is ‘renzheng (仁政)’, benevolent or
humane government, in which the government should enable families to live
well materially and educate them in ethical relationships [1A1, 1A3, 1A7,
7A22]. This ideal precludes exploitative relations and inequalities that render
such good lives impossible for the people [1A4]:
There is fat meat in your kitchen and there are well-fed horses in your stables,
yet the people look hungry and in the outskirts of cities people drop dead from
starvation.
The above observation led Mencius to condemn King Hui of Liang as a
ruler whose behaviour ‘show[s] animals the way to devour men’. The appro-
priate relationship between a ruler and his people under benevolent govern-
ment is one based on care, where the ruler acts like a ‘parent of the people’.
Such a ruler shares whatever he enjoys with his people [1A2]. Instead of indi-
viduals as separate units, relationships, particularly family relationships, are
prominent in Mencius’ ethical discussions. Instead of deciding who should
own what (determining the right division as a solution to individuals’ com-
peting claims to goods and resources), there is a preference for sharing, for
working together to try to fulfil the needs of all. When distribution cannot
be avoided, a particular distribution is acceptable, not because there is any-
thing inherently good about one way of dividing goods and resources over
others, but because it nurtures thriving families and harmonious commu-
nity. Just as yi is concerned with appropriateness in relationships, Mencius’
solutions to distributive problems—which may or may not involve dividing
benefits and burdens among individuals or groups—promote the flourishing
of an entire network of relationships that constitute a community.
The social ideal of Mencian relational ethics is a harmonious community
of persons cultivating themselves to live ethically within a network of rela-
tionships, perhaps different relational networks cross time and space. Har-
mony is unity in diversity; it does not eliminate situations where interests
compete for scarce resources. If such inevitable conflicts result in extensive
inequalities and exploitation, which is inherently divisive and alienating,
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harmony is destroyed. Some might consider this an affirmation of the need
for ‘fairness’; in other words, some kind of justice is needed for harmony.
Avoiding the philosophical baggage of ‘fairness’ as a theoretical concept
[Rawls 1971] with presuppositions that do not fit Mencius’ ethical frame-
work, one can still think of a state of affairs being ‘unfair’ as meaning that
some party has more than she should. Mencius would see such ‘unfairness’
as the result of someone wrongly setting her own desires above those of
other parties involved. Such actions are the opposite of how a person of ren
would act: ‘establish others in seeking to establish themselves and promote
others in seeking to get there themselves’ [Analects 6.30]. This idea of fair-
ness is also present in the idea of shu 恕 (sometimes translated as
‘reciprocity’): ‘do not impose on others what you yourself do not want’
[Analects 15.24]—which is also part of Confucius’ explication of ren in Ana-
lects 12.02. Fairness is not determined according to some formula of divid-
ing goods and resources; it is a matter of attending and giving as much or
more weight to other’s desires as one does to one’s own—a process that is
again relationship-centred.7
When giving advice to Duke Wen of Teng, Mencius commented on the
important (re)distributive role of government by comparing different
ancient taxation practices; and he advocated that of ‘zhu 助, which means
“to give help”’ and is distinguished by the communal cultivation of ‘public
land’ in the ‘well-field system’ (jingdi井地)8 [3A3]:
If those who own land within each jing, befriend one another both at home and
abroad, help each other to keep watch, and succor each other in illness, they
will live in love and harmony. A jing is a piece of land measuring one li square
and each jing consists of 900 mu. Of these, the central plot of 100 mu belongs
to the state, while the other eight plots of 100 mu each are held by eight fami-
lies who share the duty of caring for the plot owned by the state. Only when
they have done this duty do they dare turn to their own affairs.
The choice of zhu practice is not about what is the right quantum the govern-
ment should take from the people, which can be levied in other ways. The
cultivation of the central plot of ‘public land’ educates the people to give pri-
ority to what is shared over what is privately owned; and working together
on the public land also nurtures relationships of cooperation and mutual
help, and contributes to communal harmony.
Mencius’ solutions to distributive problems fit well with the understand-
ing of yi as relational appropriateness within his relational ethics. Compared
with theories of distributive justice centred on evaluating and guiding
actions in terms of how they divide benefits and burdens, Mencian relational
ethics requires a more holistic approach to distributive problems. Instead of
isolated acts of distribution, we consider interactive processes that constitute
relationships within which distributive problems arise, and we solve those
7 In the relationship between ruler and ruled, Mencius demands that rulers put the people’s interests first
[7B14].
8 This system is described as ‘jing 井’, literally meaning ‘a well’, because the appearance of this character
resembles the division of the plots.
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problems with reference to how those relationships could be improved or at
least not worsened. The Mencian perspective contrasts with more individu-
alistic theories that tend to focus on distribution among individuals, as the
importance of interpersonal relationships means that the appropriate units
for distribution may be groups, beginning with families. It also implies
approaching opportunities, resources, and goods differently. Mencian dis-
tributive solutions treat these not as possessions or potential possessions of
competitive individuals, as things to be possessed by one and denied to
others, but as resources that can benefit more than those to whom they are
distributed, as resources of personal cultivation effecting appropriate inter-
personal relationships constituting harmonious communities. Wherever pos-
sible, distribution of resources should prioritize provision of public goods
and service, projects that would encourage cooperation and nurture sociabil-
ity rather than adding to individual holdings.
While the text shares with contemporary theories of justice a recognition
of the moral importance of distributive problems arising from the combina-
tion of conditions of scarcity and competing/conflicting interests, its
relationship-centred perspective shifts the focus away from the question of
‘Who should own what, and how much?’ Approaches to distributive justice
that develop formulae for right divisions of benefits and burdens tend to
deepen the sense of separateness and even encourage self-centredness if, as
often happens, distribution problems are viewed as zero-sum competitions
for quantifiable resources or opportunities and each sees herself constantly
pitted against others in such competitions. This is notwithstanding the fact
that such calculative self-centredness is contrary to the moral stance of dis-
tributive justice theories demanding that those who have too much by each
theory’s reckoning acknowledge the moral claim of others. Learning from
Mencius, I would argue that the moral demand of distributive justice could
be met only if we go beyond the act of distribution as division of benefits
and burdens and attend more to the relationships among parties to any dis-
tribution, and consider how to nurture relationships in which agents are
more likely to act justly.
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